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1. Represented by coastal State jurisdiction in the territorial sea and the other coastal
zones.
2. Represented by flag State jurisdiction on the high seas.
3. Represented by every State jurisdiction against piracy and, perhaps, other
international crimes at sea.
4. MARIA GAVOUNELI, FUNCTIONAL JURISDICTION IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 146 (2007).
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FUNCTIONAL JURISDICTION IN THE LAW OF THE SEA.  By Maria Gavouneli.
Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.  2007.  Pp. xviii, 286.
In this book a brilliant and young Greek scholar addresses a number of
issues that characterize present international law of the sea.  Emphasis is
devoted to the general question of the interplay between the three most
common bases of jurisdiction; namely “territoriality,”1 “nationality,”2 and
“universality.”3  The author first elaborates on the allocation of powers
established under the 1982 United Nations Convention of the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) that determines a variety of exclusive, concurrent, parallel,
or overlapping forms of jurisdiction.  She subsequently addresses the
question of whether the jurisdictional framework set forth by UNCLOS is
final or if further changes are possible.  Indicative issues that are identified
include the balance of rights and obligations within the exclusive economic
zone, the regime of fisheries on the high seas, the challenges posed by new
activities and risks, including the exploitation of genetic resources, as well
as the need to ensure security at sea and prevent the illegal transportation
of weapons of mass destruction.
The author’s answer is that UNCLOS is “a living instrument, capable
both of change in order to accommodate new challenges and of construing
novel associations of existing provisions, both in the text itself and in other
international conventions, to support the evolving needs of the international
community.”4  In other words, UNCLOS has stood the test of time and has
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5. Id. at 178.  
6. Negotiations for the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) began in 1973 and it was adopted in 1982.
7. This occurs when UNCLOS does not provide any clearly defined regime (i.e.,
evolution in another context) or where, due to the fact that UNCLOS regime is clearly
unsatisfactory, a new instrument of universal scope has been drafted to avoid the risk of
undesirable consequences (i.e., evolution by further codification).  
8. See, e. g., the sweeping beginning of chapter two: “The casual reader of the Law of
the Sea Convention—assuming that such a rare beast exists . . . .”  Id. at 33. 
“provided a solid foundation on which individual States and the world
community as a whole were able to explore new approaches to emerging
challenges.”5
I personally do not fully share this conclusion.  In my view, while being
a monumental achievement for the codification of international law,
UNCLOS, as any legal text, is linked to the period when it was negotiated
and adopted.6  Being itself a product of time, it cannot stop the passing of
time.  Yet international law of the sea is subject to a process of natural
evolution and progressive development that is linked to States’ practice. It
is not possible to elaborate in this review on the instances not only where
changes with respect to the original UNCLOS regime have been integrated
into UNCLOS itself (i.e., evolution by integration), or where different
interpretations of the relevant UNCLOS provisions are in principle
admissible and States’ practice may be important in making one interpreta-
tion prevail (i.e., evolution by interpretation), but also where the relevant
legal regime is to be inferred only from States’ practice.7
In addition, my personal impression is that the conclusions of the book
could have been different if other subjects had been added to those selected
by the author.  These subjects could have included areas where UNCLOS
does not say anything, such as the delimitation of maritime zones, or where
UNCLOS regime appears even counterproductive, such as the protection
of the underwater cultural heritage.  However, even though the volume
overestimates the role of UNCLOS, this does not detract from the high
quality of the research endeavour undertaken and from the fact that all the
opinions exposed in it are thoroughly developed and almost always
persuasive.
Apart from its general purpose, the study is full of thought-provoking
remarks which confirm the critical and dialectical inclination of the author.
In certain cases one can also find an ironical vein that, while not frequent,
can only be welcome in legal books.8  For example, the description of the
attempt to understand the extent of the European Union’s competence in
the field of law of the sea is rightly qualified by the author as an “uphill
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9. GAVOUNELI, supra note 4, at 52.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 58. 
12. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 94, para. 6, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
13. GAVOUNELI, supra note 4, at 37.  
14. Id. at 69.  
15. Id. at 131-32.  
16. For example, I am not convinced that there is a need to recall the Nottebohm,
Barcelona Traction, or Elettronica Sicula cases to explain the flag State jurisdiction and the
concept of genuine link in international law of the sea.  See id. at 34-39.
battle . . . [where] [i]llumination must therefore be sought.”9  The results
are “clearly not conducive to legal certainty” and “solace” can hardly be
found10 in a “jurisdictional conundrum of Herculean proportions.”11  Here
the author should be appreciated for taking an orientation different from the
plethora of hagiographical comments commonly reserved in many legal
books to all the European Union’s manifestations.  Another strong, but
fully justified, criticism is devoted by the author to Article 94, paragraph
6, of UNCLOS,12 a provision that, by “coyly” prescribing a notification
procedure,13 can in fact be turned into a means to support the practice of flags
of convenience.  Also noteworthy are some progressive positions taken by the
author, in particular where she does not think it is inconceivable that within
the exclusive economic zone, “under specific circumstances, the need to
safeguard the marine environment, a customary obligation binding upon
every State on the planet, would necessitate the suspension of navigation,
certainly temporarily but also permanently . . . .”14  Lastly, the author points
out that the traditional freedom to fish on the high seas is essentially
converting itself into “a right of access to fisheries conditional upon the
adoption of coordinated measures of fisheries conservation and manage-
ment.15”
Another rare quality of the book is the quotation in the footnotes and
bibliography of works written in languages other than English, such as
French, Spanish, Italian and, of course, Greek.  This can only enlarge the
scope of the analysis and provide the reader with references that are not
easily available elsewhere.  Some perplexity is, on the contrary, raised by
a few quotations which do not seem strictly relevant to the subject matter.16
In conclusion, this is a work that immediately attracts the attention and
the interest of the reader and can only be recommended as a source of
thought, reflection, agreement and, sometimes, disagreement.
